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 We set out to address a gap in the management literature by proposing a framework
 specifying the component capacities organizational actors require to think and act
 morally. We examine how moral maturation (i.e., moral identity, complexity, and
 metacognitive ability) and moral conation (i.e., moral courage, efficacy, and owner-
 ship) enhance an individual's moral cognition and propensity to take ethical action.
 We offer propositions to guide future research and discuss the implications of the
 proposed model for management theory and practice.
 There is growing recognition that organiza-
 tions are operating in increasingly more com-
 plex and often global environments that inher-
 ently impose difficult moral challenges on
 organization members (e.g., Donaldson, 2003;
 George, 2007; Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio, & Ca-
 varretta, 2009a). This increased complexity is
 due to a number of factors, including greater
 scrutiny over individuals' actions, more de-
 mands for transparency, the necessity for orga-
 nizations to work across competing governmen-
 tal and legal systems, expanded organizational
 stakeholders with competing interests, and the
 need to operate across different cultures that
 constitute diverse sets of values.
 Paralleling a rise in the complexity of organi-
 zational challenges, popular belief suggests
 that the scope and scale of greed and malfea-
 sance in organizations are escalating (George,
 2007). In response to these trends, a growing
 number of organizations and governments are
 establishing ethics offices and developing new
 ethical policies and mandatory ethics training
 (Donaldson, 2003). As organizations strive to de-
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 velop the moral capacity of employees, the tim-
 ing seems propitious to offer a theoretical
 framework examining what constitutes the
 moral capacity of individuals in the workplace
 and how that capacity drives the way individu-
 als respond to ethical challenges. Conse-
 quently, our primary motivation for writing this
 article is to offer a comprehensive and testable
 theoretical framework to serve as the basis for
 guiding future research and practice concerning
 the moral capacities needed to process a moral
 challenge from recognition to action.
 We suggest below that there is a need for a
 new and expanded theory of moral1 develop-
 ment that better explains how individuals con-
 sider and act on moral dilemmas and tempta-
 tions. Yet we realize our position will not be
 accepted without challenge, since some may be-
 lieve the "gold standard" already exists in the
 well-known cognitive development models of
 Jean Piaget (1965/1932), Lawrence Kohlberg
 (Kohlberg, 1981; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), and
 James Rest and colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Be-
 beau, & Thoma, 1999; see also Rest, 1986, 1994).
 We build on these earlier theoretical frame-
 works in our proposed model by starting our
 1 In this article we treat the terms moral and ethical as
 synonyms.
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 discussion noting their strengths and limita-
 tions. We then proceed by proposing a new the-
 oretical moral capacity framework that can be
 used to examine how individuals process and
 respond to moral problems, as well as by focus-
 ing on how those capacities can be developed.
 First, in prior theory and research scholars
 have focused on describing the processes
 whereby individuals handle moral incidents,
 but they have not adequately explained the un-
 derlying capacities individuals require to effec-
 tively enact those processes. For example, Rest
 and colleagues (1999) made extensive contribu-
 tions to the literature on moral psychology by
 developing their four-component model. This
 model identifies four "inner psychological pro-
 cesses [that] together give rise to outwardly ob-
 servable behavior" (1999: 101) - moral sensitiv-
 ity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and
 moral action. These four processes have served
 as an important organizing framework and
 starting point for ethics research and practice.
 To understand our intended theoretical contri-
 bution, however, it is important to make several
 distinctions between Rest et al.'s as well as oth-
 ers' approach to examining ethical processes
 and our approach to exploring ethical capaci-
 ties. Rest et al. state that the moral sensitivity
 process, for example, entails steps such as "in-
 terpreting the situation, role-taking how various
 actions would affect the parties concerned,
 imagining cause-effect chains of events, and be-
 ing aware that there is a moral problem when it
 exists" (1999: 101). Research has shown that in-
 dividuals vary in their level of proficiency re-
 garding each of these four processes (e.g., Be-
 beau, 2002). Yet prior research has not
 sufficiently examined the individual capacities
 that explain the variance across individuals en-
 abling someone to effectively execute the steps
 or actions related to these four processes. Based
 on Rest et al/s description of moral sensitivity,
 for example, we might ask, "What enables a
 person to execute the steps in interpreting a
 moral challenge and then estimating cause and
 effect chains better than another?" At the pres-
 ent time prior theory and research do not ade-
 quately address this or similar questions. We
 therefore set out here to identify the specific
 individual capacities that help account for the
 level of variation across individuals in terms of
 how they process, formulate judgments about,
 and respond to moral challenges.
 Second, previous theories have focused pri-
 marily on aspects of moral judgment while not
 adequately explaining the capacities needed to
 carry those judgments through to intentions and
 actions. For example, while Kohlberg (1981) fo-
 cused exclusively on explaining the core as-
 pects of moral judgment, Rest et al.#s four-
 component model suggests that moral
 judgments must also be preceded by moral
 awareness and followed by the formation of
 intentions to act and then, ultimately, action
 itself. Rest et al. conclude, however, that be-
 sides some "forays into studying Components
 3 and 4," little work has been done to explain
 moral motivation or intentions and moral ac-
 tion and that "we believe that the overall prog-
 ress in the larger enterprise of moral psychol-
 ogy can be viewed in terms of how well
 research progresses in all four inner psycho-
 logical components leads to outwardly observ-
 able behavior" (1999: 102).
 Third, prior research has highlighted the im-
 portance of individual differences in ethical pro-
 cessing, but that work has focused primarily on
 a limited set of stable individual traits. Trevino
 (1986), for example, proposed that locus of con-
 trol, ego strength, and field dependence would
 moderate the linkage between ethical cognition
 and behavior. Although these are all important
 individual stable traits that can be used to po-
 tentially explain ethical processing in part, we
 focus on malleable individual capacities that
 can be developed to enhance one's ethical cog-
 nition and behavior/actions.
 Fourth, a useful practical model of moral ca-
 pacities must explain both moral cognition and
 moral conation or the impetus to act. We define
 moral conation as the capacity to generate re-
 sponsibility and motivation to take moral action
 in the face of adversity and persevere through
 challenges . The theories of Kohlberg, Rest et al.,
 and others have focused largely on the cognitive
 processing of moral dilemmas - those complex
 intellectual choices between right versus wrong,
 or right versus right. Such models do not ad-
 dress how individuals process moral tempta-
 tions (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007), where they
 know what is best but one personal value con-
 flicts with another. In this situation the individ-
 ual must have the adequate self-regulatory ca-
 pacity to resist one action in favor of another
ction. A person may be tempted, for example, to
 participate in unethical acts performed by his or
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 her group to achieve peer acceptance, requiring
 the conation to resist such temptation and to
 stand up and take action against those who
 have done the wrong thing.2
 Fifth, more recent theories have been devel-
 oped that attempt to explain those capacities
 needed by moral actors at specific stages of
 processing a moral issue, such as Reynolds'
 (2008) theory of moral attentiveness. However,
 what is missing in the literature is a more inte-
 grated model of individual moral capacities that
 can fully explain how moral dilemmas are
 thought about and acted on across all four of
 Rest et al.'s processes. Supporting this need,
 Rest and colleagues note that "although most
 researchers would agree that there is much di-
 versity of constructs, processes, phenomena,
 and starting points for the psychology of moral-
 ity, the greater challenge is to formulate how all
 these different parts fit together" (1999: 6).
 In sum, our principle goal is to provide re-
 searchers with a conceptual framework that in-
 cludes the breadth of moral capacities required
 by moral actors to think about and act on a
 moral dilemma. Specifically, our proposed
 model seeks to achieve the following objectives:
 (1) to provide an organizing structure for an ex-
 panded set of constructs required to be devel-
 oped in moral actors, while also explaining the
 relationships and processes linking these con-
 structs; (2) to recognize both the processes moral
 actors must use and the underlying capacities
 they require to effectively enact those processes;
 and (3) to use what we have learned from the
 first two objectives to facilitate assessment and
 development by offering measurable and mal-
 leable constructs for future research and prac-
 tice in this area.
 In developing the proposed model, we exam-
 ined relevant frameworks from clinical, social,
 and developmental psychology and neurosci-
 ence, as well as leadership, organizational be-
 havior, and ethics. We assessed where each
 framework's boundary ended in contributing to
 our understanding of moral capacity and where
 another framework with compatible logic be-
 gan. We believe that our contribution to moral/
 ethical theory and practice involves advancing
 a broader "enterprise" approach, as called for
 2 For parsimony we use "dilemma" from here on to repre-
 sent all moral problems, predicaments, and temptations.
 by Rest et al. (1999), that accounts for the capac-
 ities needed for ethical awareness and decision
 making, as well as the conation to follow
 through with action.
 TOWARD AN EXPANDED MODEL OF
 MORAL CAPACITIES
 Measuring attitudes and judgments in gen-
 eral (Ajzen, 1991), as well as ethical judgments
 in particular (Bebeau, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Trevino &
 Youngblood, 1990), has generated relatively
 weak relationships in predicting actual ethical
 behavior. Despite this fact, Reynolds (2006) notes
 that ethics research has tended to focus predom-
 inantly on ethical judgment models versus eth-
 ical behavior, which is a trend that is also evi-
 dent in recent literature reviews (O'Fallon &
 Butterfield, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe,
 2008; Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). This
 trend has persisted even though Rest et al. (1999:
 101) reported that the Defining Issues Test
 (DIT) - the most commonly used measure of cog-
 nitive moral judgment capacity - typically only
 explains approximately 20 percent of the vari-
 ance in actual ethical behavior.
 Kohlberg (1981, 1986) based his model of cog-
 nitive moral development on the work of Piaget
 (1965/1932) and proposed that moral develop-
 ment is a maturation process that unfolds across
 the lifespan in six stages, whereby more com-
 plex "mental operations" related to the logic of
 morality are developed. Kohlberg originally at-
 tempted to explain overall moral development
 as stemming from cognitive development but, in
 response to critics (e.g., Gilligan, 1982), in later
 work narrowed the boundaries of his develop-
 mental theory to only apply to moral judgments
 dealing with justice issues.3
 In arguing for a "neo-Kohlbergian approach,"
 Rest and colleagues (1999) suggested that be-
 yond the limitations of solely focusing on jus-
 tice, Kohlberg's theory and scoring system was
 too "macro-moral" in that it addressed abstract
 3 Kohlberg states that "the research programme of myself
 d my Harvard colleagues has moved from restricting the
 study of morality to the study of moral development to re-
 stricting it to the study of moral judgment ... to restricting it
 to the form or cognitive-structural stage of moral judgment
 as embodied in judgments of justice"; he further states that
 he does not imply that "these restrictions should guide all
 fruitful moral psychology research" (Kohlberg, 1986: 499).
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 aspects of society (e.g.f societal norms of justice)
 versus the more commonly faced moral rela-
 tions between individuals, friends, groups, and
 organizations. Rest et al. (1999) noted that theo-
 ries need to take these more relevant, frequent,
 and typically more complex moral issues into
 account.
 Rest et al. (1999) also argued against the "hard
 stages" associated with development recom-
 mended by Kohlberg, basing their model in-
 stead on the concept of cognitive schemas. The
 authors noted that Kohlberg's theory only ad-
 dressed component 2 (moral judgment) of their
 four-component model. Yet despite this criticism
 of Kohlberg's work, Rest and colleagues' own
 work focused largely on component 2, develop-
 ing and validating the DIT, which purports to
 measure levels of moral schema development
 using hypothetical moral judgment exercises.
 Thus, while the models of Kohlberg and Rest et
 al. foremost attempt to address one aspect
 (schema development) of the cognitive capaci-
 ties that individuals need to recognize and
 judge moral issues, they do not help explain the
 self-regulatory capacities that promote how an
 individual engages his or her full cognitive ca-
 pacities in a given moral dilemma. Nor do those
 models attempt to explain why one person will
 stand up and act in the face of adver ity while
 another person of equ l ognitive capacity will
 fail to act morally (Bandura, 1991).
 Therefore, we set out to extend this prior the-
 ory and resea ch by first identifying personal
 capacities re ated to both mor l thought and
 conduct. Next, we examine how they operate as
 determinants that influence an individual's
 moral behavior.
 Overview of the Model's Core Components
 We provide an overview of the components,
 presented in Figure 1, constituting moral matu-
 ration and conation, and in subsequent sections
 we provide more in-depth analysis of each com-
 ponent. At the base of the model is a depiction of
 the four psychological processes as proposed by
 Rest et al. (1999). Moral sensitivity includes pro-
 cesses related to being aware of a moral prob-
 lem, interpreting the situation, and identifying
 various options to address the problem. Moral
 judgment concerns processes taken to deter-
 mine what action is the most proper to pursue.
 Moral motivation entails processes geared to-
 ward gaining commitment to a given action and
 the weight assigned to specific moral values
 over other values. Finally, moral action involves
 FIGURE 1
 Framework for Moral Maturation and Moral Conation
 i Experience, reflection, and feedback * •
 :
 i Moral maturation capacities i i Moral conation capacities ' '
 ' /^Moral' /^^Moral' j j /^Moral^' y^^Moral ' /^MoralXj :
 j ^complexity/ v^abilitv/ 'identityy ' ' 'ownership>y ^efficacy/ ycourage/j :
 PI P2 P3 'P5 P6 P7 P8 j
 P4 '
 P5 '
 v yr yr ' v v yt
 *
 j Moral cognition processes j j Moral conation processes ; :
 j Moral Moral j j Moral Moral ! :
 sensitivity judgment j j * motivation action ■••••«£«•»
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 persistence in a moral task, overcoming fatigue
 and various temptations and challenges to take
 the appropriate action.
 While some of these four component labels
 read akin to developed capacities, Rest et al.
 have defined them as psychological processes
 related to sequencing or addressing a moral
 dilemma. Indeed, the four components were first
 developed to categorize ethics theories and
 serve as a "heuristic tool in conceptualizing the
 psychology of morality as a whole" (Rest et al.,
 1999: 101). Yet while serving as a valuable heu-
 ristic, we believe this framework suffers from
 some important gaps. The moral motivation
 component, for example, denotes a psychologi-
 cal process where commitment to action is gen-
 erated but does not specify what individual dif-
 ferences drive that process or the level of
 commitment needed to behave in a moral man-
 ner. We therefore seek to advance Rest's work
 (1986, 1994) by articulating the moral capacities
 displayed in the upper half of Figure 1 that can
 serve to explain why individuals are more or
 less inclined and able to effectively execute
 those four processes.
 To organize our proposed model, we group
 Rest et al.'s components of moral sensitivity and
 moral judgment into moral cognition processes
 since they both entail the awareness and pro-
 cessing of information pertaining to moral is-
 sues. Further, we group the moral motivation
 and moral action components into what we term
 moral conation processes since they both entail
 the tendency for and the practice of moral be-
 havior.
 Similarly, we use the category labels moral
 maturation and moral conation to group the six
 moral capacities of our model for ease of con-
 ceptualization and description. We are not, how-
 ever, proposing higher-order latent constructs.
 Accordingly, we first define each capacity and
 then offer individual propositions related to
 each of the six capacities in our model.
 As shown in the upper portion of Figure 1, we
 suggest that the three constructs labeled moral
 maturation capacities are critical in driving
 moral cognition processes. We define moral
 maturation as the capacity to elaborate and ef-
 fectively attend to, store, retrieve , process, and
 make meaning of morally relevant information .
 Next, we suggest that the three constructs la-
 beled moral conation capacities are critical in
 driving moral motivational processes. We ear-
 lier defined moral conation as the capacity to
 genera e responsibility and motivation to take
 moral ac ion in the face of adversity and perse-
 vere t rough challenges .
 Dynamics of the Model
 Before proceeding, it is important to clarify
 three aspects of our theoretical framework. First,
 we propose that each capacity is necessary but
 not sufficient for moral decision making and
 behavior. High levels of moral complexity, for
 example, must be accompanied by sufficient
 metacognitive ability to process complex moral
 knowledge, along with a moral identity guided
 by self-regulation and processing that achieves
 a desired moral outcome.
 Second, our propositions suggest that moral
 maturation capacities will primarily drive moral
 cognitive processes, while moral conation ca-
 pacities will primarily drive moral motivational
 or conative processes. Yet we also consider in
 our discussion of the proposed model that these
 capacities may also have some influence on
 other stages of Rest et al/s four-component
 model of moral decision making. Most notably,
 as shown in Figure 1, we explicitly propose that
 moral identity is unique in that it will drive both
 moral cognition and one's motivation or
 conation to act. For example, an individual who
 has a very highly developed sense of moral
 identity will more likely exhibit ethical behav-
 iors that are more in line with his or her moral
 identity, thus enhancing the individual's moral
 conation to act (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi,
 1993; Weaver, 2006). However, we also note that
 the judgments made and actions taken may also
 vary across different moral issues and domains,
 even where the individual has a highly devel-
 oped moral identity.
 Finally, as suggested by the shaded dotted
 line "Experience, reflection, and feedback" in
Figure 1, we propose that these six capacities
 are all open to development, which goes beyond
 earlier literature primarily focusing on identify-
 ing stable traits and attributes that may influ-
 ence moral judgments and actions. Conse-
 quently, we provide in our discussion some
 preliminary suggestions on how these capaci-
 ties could best be measured and developed to
 help initiate and guide future research in this
 area.
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 In order to provide sufficient space to fully
 define the six capacities included in our model,
 we do not spend a great deal of time focusing on
 contextual factors that might influence these re-
 spective capacities. However, we fully recognize
 that the context, including the characteristics,
 culture, and climate of the organization
 (Trevino, 1986; Trevino & Youngblood, 1990), and
 other factors, such as leadership (Brown,
 Trevino, & Harrison, 2005; Mayer, Kuenzi, Green-
 baum, Bardes, & Salvador, 2009), are also impor-
 tant elements that could significantly influence
 individual moral processing, motivation, and
 behaviors. We highlight some of these contex-
 tual factors that should be included in future
 research in the discussion section.
 MORAL MATURATION
 Understanding what constitutes moral matu-
 ration requires greater refinement, beyond Kohl-
 berg's (1981) specific stage model of cognitive
 moral development and Rest et al.'s three levels
 of cognitive development (i.e., personal interest,
 maintaining norms, and postconventional). Rest
 et al. recognized the coarseness of their ap-
 proach, noting, "We recognize that the cognitive
 structures we talk about are somewhere be-
 tween cognitive development stages and social
 schemas" (1999: 185). To refine Rest et al.'s
 stages we incorporate theories of cognitive com-
 plexity (e.g., Streufert & Nogami, 1989), thereby
 decomposing individuals' mental representa-
 tions of moral knowledge into more refined as-
 pects of content and structure to help better ex-
 plain what constitutes cognitive moral
 maturation (e.g., Street, Douglas, Geiger, & Mar-
 tinko, 2001).
 Complexity of Moral Representations
 We know that individuals are more or less
 complex in their mental representations of var-
 ious domains of knowledge based on their
 breadth of experience and learning across the
 life span (Bandura, 1991; Schroder, Driver, &
 Streufert, 1967; Streufert & Nogami, 1989), includ-
 ing in different moral domains (Narvaez, 2010;
 Swanson & Hill, 1993). Here we use the term
 domain to mean a specific area of ethics (e.g.,
 accounting ethics, medical ethics, military eth-
 ics, or parenting ethics). Individuals can have
 more or less complex representations of each
 knowledge doma n, depending on their level o
 development. Greater complexity in a given do-
 m in is composed o  highly differentiated and
 richly connected mental repres ntations hat
 the individual can call on to allow him or her to
 process information in greater depth and with
 more elaboration (Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002;
 Streufert & Nogami, 1989). For example, Be-
 beau's (2002) work in the dental profession sug-
 gests that dentists will have varying levels of
 complexity associated with dental ethics. Fur-
 ther, a dentist may have low levels of moral
 complexity in other domains, such as account-
 ing ethics or, more generally, biomedical ethics,
 lacking adequate knowledge in those areas of
 ethics to process and apply information to a
 given dilemma with depth and elaboration.
 Moral complexity is a critical moral capacity
 because the distinctive dimensions individuals
 use to organize and make meaning of the world
 strongly influence how they make decisions and
 behave within a specific domain (Rafaeli-Mor &
Steinberg, 2002; Streufert & Nogami, 1989). All
 other things being equal, more cognitively com-
 plex individuals process information more thor-
 oughly because they have more categories to
 discriminate among information received in
 their environment and are more able to see com-
 monal ties and connections among those cate-
 gories (Schroder et al., 1967; Streufert & Nogami,
 1989). This led Hannah, Lester, and Vogelgesang
 (2005) to propose that rich moral representations
 will help individuals achieve greater coherence
 when processing complex moral dilemmas.
 Greater moral complexity provides a larger and
 more developed set of prototypes with which to
 process moral information, and these prototypes
 are drawn on during either controlled or auto-
 matic processing of ethical challenges/incidents
 (see Reynolds, 2006; Sonenshein, 2007). There-
 fore, the concept of moral complexity underpins
 what Werhane (1999) calls "moral imagination,"
 or the ability to understand the various dimen-
 sions of moral dilemmas and develop various
 moral "realities" to consider and with which to
 create imaginative solutions. This occurs be-
 cause more cognitively complex individuals are
 better able to acquire and make sense of com-
 peting information, while spending more time
 interpreting a broader range of information to
 help resolve dilemmas (e.g., Bower & Hilgard,
 1981; Dollinger, 1984). Indeed, in their work with
 adolescents, Swanson and Hill (1993) found that
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 richer moral knowledge predicted higher moral
 reasoning. Narvaez (2010) suggests that more
 complex moral actors will also have greater
 "negative expertise" in that they will know what
 actions not to take when facing a moral di-
 lemma.
 Beyond enhancing the processing of moral
 judgments, moral complexity should also en-
 hance moral sensitivity (i.e., stage 1 of Rest et
 al.'s four-stage model). Reynolds notes that indi-
 viduals differ from one another in moral atten-
 tiveness, which he proposes enables greater
 sensitivity to moral issues, and he calls for fu-
 ture research to determine the "origins of moral
 attentiveness" (2008: 1039). In response to Reyn-
 olds call, we suggest that moral complexity is a
 central antecedent to moral attentiveness be-
 cause individuals have a heightened propensity
 to attend to information that is consistent with
 their mental representations, while discounting
 incongruent information (Dutton & Jackson,
 1987). This suggests that the more distinct inter-
 nal dimensions or prototypes people possess to
 perceive "moral cues," the more likely and able
 they will be to perceive and attend to moral
 indicators, when present.
 Moral judgments are also inherently contex-
 tualized. Groups, organizations, and societies
 seek to function on a shared set of values (Victor
 & Cullen, 1988), and yet those values vary, per-
 haps extensively, across different collectives
 (Margolis & Phillips, 1999; Shweder, 1991). Even
 when individuals agree on sets of values or
 moral standards, the meanings and applica-
 tions of those standards are often contentious
 (Sonenshein, 2007). Given this equivocality, we
 do not offer prescriptions as to any specific
 knowledge content comprising moral complex-
 ity as being more or less "moral" - only that
 greater complexity in a given moral domain(s)
 will drive more elaborate moral judgments con-
 cerning that domain. We define elaborate moral
 judgment as the extent to which an individual
 differentiates and integrates moral information .
 Moral complexity, therefore, incorporates rich
 knowledge content representative of the moral-
 ity of a given culture or social group. With this in
 mind, we suggest that our proposed model can
 be generalized across cultures and organiza-
 tions yet needs to be further specified within
 any given culture by incorporating the virtues,
 norms, and mores of that culture to determine
 what constitutes moral, immoral, or even amoral
 complex knowledge (Margolis & Phillips, 1999;
 Shweder, 1991). In sum, the extent to which indi-
 viduals possess moral complexity in a given
 domain will enhance their level of moral sensi-
 tivity and ability to differentiate and integrate
 (i.e., elaborate) moral information in that do-
 main, particularly since people tend to use the
 highest stages of cognitive development avail-
 able to them when processing moral dilemmas,
 if ample motivation exists (Trevino, 1992). This
 leads to our first proposition.
 Proposition 1: Higher (lower) levels of
 complexity in a specific domain(s) of
 moral knowledge will be associated
 with higher (lower) levels of (a) moral
 sensitivity and (b) elaborative moral
 judgments in that domain(s).
 Metacognitive Ability
 The next moral maturation capacity in our
 model is metacognitive ability. We include this
 capacity to explain the variance in individual
 ability to use moral complexity to enhance
 moral cognition (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994;
 Narvaez, 2010). We propose that moral complex-
 ity provides a deeper understanding of what
 constitutes moral maturation, thus going be-
 yond the general conceptualizations of Kohl-
 berg's or Rest et al.'s stages. A high level of
 complexity is, however, like fuel without an en-
 gine to process that fuel. Street et al. (2001) argue
 that individuals also need the capacity or "en-
 gine" to deeply process complex moral knowl-
 edge. As with other constructs in our proposed
 model, we focus on metacognitive ability as a
 developed capacity underlying such depth of
 processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), and we sug-
 gest some techniques to measure and develop
 this construct.
 Metacognitive ability is composed of monitor-
 ing and regulating cognitive processes, thus
 serving both self-referential and executive con-
 trol functions (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Met-
 calfe & Shimamura, 1994), which are critical for
 moral cognition. Metacognitive ability has been
 shown to be related to yet distinct from general
 intelligence or cognitive ability (see Dunlosky &
 Metcalfe, 2009, and Veenman & Elshout, 1999).
 Recent neuroscience research has shown that
 these general and more specific cognitive abil-
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 ities each draw from different neural capacities
 (e.g., Jausovec, 2008).
 Overall intelligence or cognitive ability refers
 to the general capacity to reason and solve
 problems, which is distinct from the ability to
 regulate and control cognition as these reason-
 ing processes unfold (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009;
 Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Indeed, research
 has shown that as an individual gains expertise
 in a certain domain, the individual's metacogni-
 tive ability gets progressively more tailored to
 processing information in that domain. Conse-
 quently, over time, the direct influence of gen-
 eral intellectual ability diminishes as an indi-
 vidual acquires expertise in a domain, while the
 impact of metacognition increases on how that
 individual processes information (Veenman &
 Elshout, 1999). This suggests that at higher lev-
 els of development, moral cognitive functioning
 will be guided less by some general moral in-
 telligence and more by metacognitive ability
 that has been tailored to various areas of prior
 moral experiences - with that metacognitive
 ability drawing on underlying complex moral
 knowledge developed within specific domains
 (i.e., moral complexity).
 We suggest that by acquiring higher levels of
 moral metacognitive ability, individuals will
 also enhance their moral sensitivity and moral
 judgment. This is because complex moral dilem-
 mas require the capacity to select from, access,
 and modify moral knowledge and to apply elab-
 orative reasoning to the specific moral dilemma
 being confronted in order for an individual to
 achieve a sense of logical coherence. Metacog-
 nitive ability provides the executive control
 functions over these processes, determining
 what is attended to and recalled by an individ-
 ual (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994), along with
 the selection and employment of mental proto-
 types (Reynolds, 2008; Sonenshein, 2007) used
 during ethical decision making. Prior research
 indicates that these metacognitive processes
 can become so tailored and habituated that they
 become automated and triggered by cues in the
 context (e.g., Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998; Metcalfe
 & Shimamura, 1994). Where these metacognitive
 abilities have become habituated, we expect to
 see a greater use of automatic moral processing
 of ethical dilemmas.
 Separating moral complexity from an individ-
 ual's ability to process that complexity via meta-
 cognition helps explain individual differences
 in the use of moral capacity when judging moral
 issues (Thoma, Rest, & Davidson, 1991). This dis-
 tinction may also be particularly useful in ex-
 plaining how individuals process ethical issues
 that force them to address multiple competing
 values. For example, higher levels of metacog-
 nitive ability would enhance the monitoring and
 control over what information is being used in
 making a judgment, assessments of that infor-
 mation's accuracy, influences of emotions or
 c mpeting values on judgment, and whether all
 possible aspects of a moral dilemma have been
 considered. This leads to our next proposition.
 Proposition 2: Higher (lower) levels of
 moral metacognitive ability will be
 associated with higher (lower) levels
 of (a) moral sensitivity and (b) elabo-
 rative moral judgments.
 Moral Identity
 Another limitation of Rest's (1986, 1994) and
 Kohlberg's (1981) models is that they focus on
 moral domain knowledge in determining what
 constitutes cognitive moral development (justice
 concepts in the case of Kohlberg, as noted ear-
 lier). Yet research has shown that in addition to
 knowledge of concepts of morality, individuals'
 knowledge about themselves as moral actors
 (i.e., moral identity) is also critical in driving
 both moral cognition and moral conation (e.g.,
 Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009). This
 is because self-identity consists of the most acces-
 sible and elaborate knowledge structures individ-
 uals hold (Hannah, Woolfolk, & Lord, 2009b; Kihl-
 strom, Beer, & Klein, 2003) and, thus, imposes a
 strong influence on how individuals regulate
 thought and control behavior (Carver & Scheier,
 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004). Therefore, identity can-
 not be separated from moral processing, particu-
 larly since moral and immoral actions all influ-
 ence one's self-evaluations (e.g., "Am I a good
 person?") and sense of self-consistency (e.g.,
 "What ethical action is most in line with my be-
 liefs about myself?").
 The self-regulatory functions provided by
 moral identity are critical in rounding out and
 more fully explaining what constitutes moral
 maturation. Moral complexity and metacogni-
 tive ability combined provide a richer elabora-
 tion of moral knowledge, yet these processes
 mu t be guided by self-regulatory standards
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 used when processing moral incidents/events
 (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004). For
 example, highly complex individuals might
 come up with ways to justify moral disengage-
 ment if such rich processing is not guided by
 self-standards.
 We are certainly not the first to propose that
 moral identity is critical to moral processing
 and behavior (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi,
 1993; Weaver, 2006). For example, Reynolds and
 Ceranic (2007) demonstrated that moral identity
 is an important construct in helping to explain
 the link between moral judgments and behavior.
 Here we suggest that prior work on moral iden-
 tity can be expanded in three specific ways.
 First, instead of conceptualizing moral identity
 in isolation, we integrate moral identity with
 other interrelated capacities of moral matura-
 tion and link moral identity to Rest et al.'s four-
 component model.
 Second, we approach moral identity as com-
 posed of more than self-descriptive moral traits.
 Aquino and Reed's (2002) construct of moral
 identity, for example, includes nine Kantian-like
 moral traits, including caring, compassionate,
 fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking,
 honest, and kind. Identity, however, is thought to
 include not only traits but other dynamic struc-
 tures, including roles, goals and motivation, af-
 fect, and autobiographical narratives, along
 with other components (Hill & Roberts, 2010;
 Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011). We therefore
 conceptualize moral identity as a more complex
 structure.
 Third, we propose that moral identity is not a
 singular identity structure but is multifaceted
 and represented across various identities (Han-
 nah et al., 2009b). We therefore incorporate self-
 complexity theory (e.g., Linville, 1987; Woolfolk,
 Gara, Allen, & Beaver, 2004) with moral identity
 theory to help explain the multifaceted nature of
 moral identity. We believe that this third contri-
 bution is critical if we are to understand why
 moral behavior varies across situations in the
 workplace, which is a question that largely has
 been unanswered in the literature (Hardy &
 Carlo, 2005).
 Prior theories of moral identity have focused
 on the content associated with an individual's
 self-concept (i.e., how people see themselves as
 a moral being/actor) and have operationalized
 moral identity by asking participants to respond
 to the extent various traits apply to their overall
 global identity. This approach has expl citly as-
 sumed that (1) individuals possess a unified
 moral identity that is distinct from other identi-
 ties they hold, (2) this moral identity can be more
 or less central to individuals' overall identity,
 and (3) situations influence how accessible or
 salient this moral identity is at any point in time
 (see Aquino et al., 2009).
 As we suggested above, we believe that there
 are important alternative ways of conceptualiz-
 ing moral identity that move beyond viewing it
 as a unified concept, and we use self-complex-
 ity theory to support our position (e.g., Hannah
et al., 2009b; Linville, 1987). Consequently, we
 suggest that moral identity is not a separate
 intact identity, any more than "sociable" is a
 separate identity. Instead, self-complexity the-
 ory suggests that identity content (e.g., moral
 or sociable) is instead structured across the
 various subidentities that make up a person's
 multifaceted identity. These subidentities are
 largely based on social roles, such as parent
 or team leader, and are developed as actors
 perform these roles over time (Markus & Wurf,
 1987). This suggests that each social role will
 be composed of different forms and levels of
 moral identity content. Specifically, we pro-
 pose that the content of moral identity consists
 of self-knowledge components (e.g., "What do I
 stand for?" or "What are my core beliefs?") and
 evaluative components (e.g., "Am I a moral
 person?" or "How well do I stand up for my
 beliefs?") and their associated sets of goals,
 affect, self-regulatory plans, etc., whereas
 struc ure refers to how such content is orga-
 nized and categorized across the social roles
 composing one's overall identity (Woolfolk et
 al., 2004).
 One's overall self-identity is thus elaborate
 and differentiated, actually being more of an
 ass mblage of selves rather than a unified
 whole (Markus & Wurf, 1987). For example, one
 can see oneself as highly truthful in one's role
 as a team leader, but less so in one's secondary
 role as a company media spokesperson. Moral
 identity can thus be defined and measured as
 more or less complex based on how rich and
 differentiated it is as structured across individ-
 uals' self-identities (Hannah et al., 2009b; Lord et
 al., 2011). For instance, in a self-complexity
 stu y Woolfolk et al. (2004) demonstrated that
 ethics-related attributes, such as honest, selfish,
 scornful, admirable, bad, dependable, and dis-
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 honest, were represented to greater and lesser
 extents across participants' various subidenti-
 ties. Further, emerging research has demon-
 strated that individuals' preferences and values
 change when separate subidentities are primed
 (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010). For example,
 Reicher and Levine (1994) showed that when a
 scientist versus a student identity was primed,
 individuals had more favorable attitudes to-
 ward practices such as animal vivisection. To-
 gether, this research suggests that a self-
 complexity approach will offer a more refined
 understanding of the multifaceted moral iden-
 tity, and thereby variance in moral thought and
 behavior across situations and social roles.
 Moral identity and the unity of the self. A
 complex, differentiated moral identity, however,
 does not suggest individuals are devoid of core
 values or consistency in their self-identity. As
 discussed earlier, individuals' level of complex-
 ity is represented both by their differentiation
 and integration of knowledge - in this case self-
 knowledge. Taking this position helps to ex-
 plain how one can differ as a moral actor across
 various roles (i.e., differentiation) yet at the
 same time understand one's consistency or lack
 thereof across those roles based on certain core
 attributes (i.e., integration). Concerning integra-
 tion, greater moral identity complexity would
 therefore be associated with what has been
 called "self-unity," defined as "the extent to
 which self-beliefs (e.g. perceived personal attri-
 butes) are clearly and confidently defined, inter-
 nally consistent, and stable" (Campbell et al.,
 1996: 141).
 Using justice as an example, a person may
 identify him/herself as being a fair individual
 across a broad range of social roles. These roles
 could then "roll up" and contribute to a more
 integrated or generalized aspect of self-identity
 as a just person (Hannah et al., 2009b; Hill &
 Roberts, 2010). This same person, however, may
 be more differentiated across subidentities
 based on other aspects of moral identity. The
 concept of unity thus provides an underlying
 basis for what Aquino et al. (2009) and others
 have called the "centrality of moral identity."
 We suggest that unity is not a separate identity
 as proposed by Aquino et al. but, rather, is the
 the extent to which select moral content is rep-
 resented centrally across aspects of one's self-
 identity, and therefore highly salient. Impor-
 tantly, applying self-complexity and related
 m asures to moral identity will llow research-
 ers to assess both differentiati n and integra-
 tion/unity, as well as the concomitant effects of
 each on the moral behaviors enacted.
 Aspects of moral identity held with higher lev-
 els of unity are especially critical in driving
 moral cognition and conation, in that we know
 that individuals have higher self-awareness for
 more core and salient aspects of the self (Setter-
 lund & Niedenthal, 1993). Higher salience also
 increases moral sensitivity and attentiveness
 and the rapid processing of moral dilemmas
 that match patterns or prototypes familiar to an
 individual (Reynolds, 2008). We also know from
 research on self- verification (Swann, 1983) and
 cybernetic self-regulatory processes (e.g.,
 Carver & Scheier, 1998; Lord & Brown, 2004) that
 pe ple are motivated to behave in ways consis-
 tent with salient core self-attributes. This sort of
 consistency allows them to maintain the integ-
 r ty f their self-concept and, thus, creates
 conation for self-congruent behavior (Verplan-
 ken & Holland, 2002). Consistent with this re-
 search, Stahlberg, Peterson, and Dauenheimer
 (1999) demonstrated that in areas where people
 have high self-unity, they tend toward self-
 verifying motives to confirm their existing self-
 beliefs in order to establish stability in "who
 they are," whereas in areas of lower unity, they
 are more likely to lean toward self-enhancing
 motives.
 Because ethical dilemmas typically present
 individuals with competing values and choices,
 this combined research suggests that in areas
 where the self is less "invested" (i.e., low unity),
 individuals may be more likely to swing to other
 values and perhaps away from taking moral
 action. This suggests that organizations may
 want to develop high levels of unity across their
 members' respective subidentities for those crit-
 ical core organizational values where they want
 to ensure that their members will make "the
 right" decision when facing difficult choices.
 Moral identity and self-complexity. Aquino et
 al. (2009) conceptualized individuals as possess-
 ing a single global moral identity more or less
 c ral to their overall identity, and that various
 situations influence how accessible this moral
 identity is at any point in time. Building on this
 work, a self-complexity approach is, we believe,
 a more refined approach that considers both
 moral content and structure, proposing that in-
 dividuals possess both integration (i.e., unity)
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 and differentiation of moral content across the
 self (see LeBoeuf et al., 2010; Reicher & Levine,
 1994; Woolfolk et al., 2004). With this theoretical
 framework, the influence of moral identity on
 moral cognition and conation would be based
 on (1) what subset of an individual's identity
 (e.g., a social role) is activated in a given situa-
 tion and (2) what moral content that subset con-
 tains. Instead of asking, "How active is one's
 global moral identity?" as suggested by prior
 research (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009), we ask,
 "Which identity is activated and what is the
 unique moral makeup of that identity?"
 This approach may better explain cross-
 situational variability in moral thought and ac-
 tion through assessing the activation of specific
 moral content in the working self-concept
 (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Because the self-concept
 is a vast and manifold structure, only a subset of
 identity is activated at any one point in time.
 This portion - the working self-concept - in-
 cludes aspects of identity and associated cogni-
 tive, affective, and motivational components
 that are activated in a specific situation and
 that drive thoughts and behaviors in that situa-
 tion (Lord et al., 2011). For example, the identity
 of "self as parent" may have highly salient and
 accessible content associated with role model-
 ing and discipline, which guides a parent to
 closely regulate his or her own behavior (e.g.,
 control the use of profanity) and to quickly dis-
 cipline a child for even the slight use of profan-
 ity. Conversely, the individual's identity as "self
 as coworker" may include less emphasis on be-
 ing a moral disciplinarian. When the coworker
 role is active during the workday, the individual
 may be much less sensitive to moral issues re-
 lated to coworker behavior. This difference in
 moral sensitivity may impact not only moral
 judgments at work but also the motivation to act
 once a judgment is reached. The net result is a
 coworker who might allow his or her own and
 other coworkers' behavior to degenerate below
 a level that would not be tolerated as a parent.
 Consequently, examining both the content and
 structure of moral identity can provide a deeper
 understanding of moral thought and behavior
 within and between the various roles that indi-
 viduals maintain as part of their personal and
 work identities.
 This discussion of moral identity and self-
 complexity suggests that (1) the assemblage
 (content and structure) of moral identity can be
 defined as more or less complex, and (2) the
 makeup of that identity will influence moral
 cognition and conation through the activation of
 various working selves across contexts. We now
 suggest that (3) a more complex moral identity
 will provide a broader base of moral content
 that individuals may draw from. Based on the
 discussion of cognitive differentiation presented
 earlier, more complex individuals can better tai-
 lor their working self across a broader range of
 situations (Hannah et al., 2009b; Lord et al., 2011;
 Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). This aligns with
 Yearley's discussion of virtue ethics: "I do not
 act benevolently in order to be benevolent or to
 be seen as benevolent by myself or others
 act benevolently because the situation I face fits
 a description of a situation that elicits my be-
 nevolence" (1990: 14). In sum, individuals' moral
 content will vary in levels of complexity - that
 is, differentiation and integration/unity across
 different social roles. The structure and content
 of moral identity will therefore influence its ac-
 tivation and extent of influence in the working
 self, and thereby drive moral cognition and
 conation. In summarizing this research on moral
 identity, we propose the following.
 Proposition 3: Higher (lower) overall
 levels of moral identity complexity
 will be associated with higher (lower)
 levels of (a) moral sensitivity and (b)
 elaborative moral judgments across
 situations.
 Proposition 4: Higher (lower) levels of
 moral complexity in the activated
 working self will be associated with
 higher (lower) levels of (a) moral sen-
 sitivity and (b) elaborative moral judg-
 ments within that situation .
 Proposition 5: Dimensions of moral
 identity with higher (lower) levels of
 unity will be related to higher (lower)
 levels of (a) moral sensitivity ; (b) elab-
 orative moral judgments , (c) moral
 motivation, and (d) moral action con-
 cordant with those core dimensions .
 MORAL CONATION
 As noted by Rest et al. (1999) and others (e.g.,
 Thoma et al., 1991), the processes of moral moti-
 vation and moral action, and more so the capac-
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 ities that produce such conation, have not been
 adequately developed in the literature. This
 lack of attention is surprising, given research
 demonstrating relatively weak relationships be-
 tween ethical judgments and ethical behaviors
 (Bebeau, 2002; Blasi, 1980; Trevino & Young-
 blood, 1990). This gap points to the importance of
 the moral conation capacities depicted in Fig-
 ure 1. Advancing a model of moral capacity for
 use in dynamic organizations where individuals
 face competing values will require identifying
 and developing the factors that underlie the
 transference of moral judgments into action. We
 build the construct of moral conation drawing
 from literature on (1) human agency, psycholog-
 ical ownership, and engagement (e.g., Bandura,
 1991, 1999; May, Gilson, & Harter, 2004; Pierce,
 Kostova, & Dirks, 2003); (2) self- and means effi-
 cacy (e.g., Bandura, 1997; Eden, 2001); and (3)
 courage (e.g., Gould, 2005; Kidder, 2003). We pro-
 pose that these three constructs are distinct yet
 support each other. Affirming our position, Oss-
 wald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, and Frey state that
 "before a person can act with moral courage,
 s/he has to perceive an incident as a situation of
 moral courage, s/he has to take responsibility
 [i.e., moral ownership] and has to feel competent
 [i.e., moral efficacy] to act" (2009: 98).
 Moral Ownership
 Kohlberg and Candee (1984) proposed that a
 sense of responsibility must first be formed be-
 fore people will initiate dedicated moral action.
 Jones and Ryan's (1997, 1998) moral approbation
 model suggests that individuals attribute their
 level of responsibility for taking moral action us-
 ing their various referent groups as standards.
 This attribution is based on assessments of the
 severity of the consequences, moral certainty,
 degree of complicity, and extent of pressure
 from organizational factors. Individuals will
 then act if their level of anticipated approbation
 from their referent group exceeds their desired
 level of approbation. This suggests that, unlike
 the influence of stable traits, such as locus of
 control on moral processing (Trevino, 1986),
 moral approbation will vary across situations as
 one's reference group and other factors change.
 To represent this sense of ownership, we pro-
 pose a construct of moral ownership, which, we
 suggest, will create unique causations or con-
 tingencies in this psychological approbation
 process thr ugh n internally driven orientation
 for moral action. Pierce et al. (2003) propose that
individuals hold varying levels of psychological
 ownership for various aspects of their environ-
 ment, or wh t they call "targets." They define
 psychological ownership as "the state in which
 individuals feel as though the target of owner-
 ship or a piece of that target is theirs" (2003: 86).
 While not yet applied to ethics, we put forth in
 our model a specific form of moral ownership we
 define as the extent to which members feel a
 sense of psychological responsibility over the
 ethical nature of their own actions, those of oth-
 ers around them, their organization, or another
 collective . This "other collective" could be a
 group, a club, or even a society.
 Like the other moral conation constructs, we
 suggest moral ownership is state-like, varying
 across "targets" and contexts. Unlike general
 beliefs about the extent to which individuals
 can control the general events in their life, as
 reflected in concepts like locus of control
 (Trevino, 1986), individuals will vary in the ex-
 tent they want to or feel a sense of responsibility
 to take ethical action in a given situation and
 not others (Bandura, 1991, 1999).
 Bandura's (1991, 1999) theory of moral agency
 is helpful in identifying the underlying psycho-
 logical mechanisms that create (or reduce) a
 sense of moral ownership across contexts. Ban-
 dura defines agency as the capacity to exercise
 control over the nature and quality of one's life.
 As the central organizing principle of social cog-
 nitive theory, agency reflects individuals' en-
 gagement in their experiences. Bandura argues
 that interactions occur between the person (e.g.,
 cognition, identity, and affect), his/her behavior,
 and his/her environment. Through these interac-
 tions, people can be producers as well as prod-
 ucts of their environments. However, Bandura
 (1991, 1999) suggests that individuals may use
 "moral disengagement" techniques, such as dif-
 fusi g responsibility to or attributing blame to
 others, or discounting the extent of harm asso-
 ciated with their behavior, in order to psycho-
 logically disengage from their actions and
 thereby maintain a positive self-image. Tenbrun-
 sel and Messick (2004) make a similar argument,
 noting that individuals may employ strategies
of self-deception during the omission of ethical
 or commission of unethical acts so as to deceive
 themselves into believing that their ethical prin-
 ciples are still being upheld. We suggest that
 2011 Hannah, Avolio, and May 675
 higher levels of moral ownership will combat
 these tendencies.
 Bandura (1991) suggests that people vary in
 how much they practice four aspects of agency:
 (1) intentionality - the extent to which acts of
 agency are done intentionally, (2) forethought -
 the extent to which agents anticipate likely con-
 sequences of actions and select courses of ac-
 tion that produce desired outcomes and avoid
 detrimental ones, (3) self-reactiveness - the level
 of ability to self-motivate and self-regulate to
 achieve goals, and (4) self-reflectiveness - the
 level of ability to reflect on the adequacy of
 one's thoughts and actions. While these theoret-
 ical processes have not been adequately stud-
 ied empirically, they do provide a basis for un-
 derstanding the underlying psychological
 processes that may drive moral ownership as
 we have defined it in this article. We suggest
 that moral ownership represents individuals'
 sense of responsibility for and impetus to stand
 up and act to influence morality in their current
 environment. A lack of moral ownership would
 likely predict various negative outcomes, such
 as a failure to act when moral action is needed,
 or more subtle forms of poor organizational cit-
 izenship, such as social loafing.
 In sum, moral ownership will prompt conation
 to act since those with higher levels of owner-
 ship are simply less able to turn a blind eye.
 This is consistent with the findings of Janoff-
 Bulman, Sheikh, and Hepp (2009), who showed
 that some individuals demonstrate a proscrip-
 tive morality (avoid doing bad) while others
 have a prescriptive focus (seek to do good). In a
 similar line of research, Ryan and Riordan (2000)
 showed that some people seek to avoid blame
 while others seek to earn praise through taking
 moral action. Moral ownership may help ex-
 plain these motivational profiles, since we
 would expect high levels of ownership to spon-
 sor prescriptive motivation and action. This
 leads to our next proposition.
 Proposition 6: Higher (lower) levels of
 moral ownership will be associated
 with higher (lower) levels of (a) moral
 motivation and (b) moral action .
 Moral Efficacy
 One can make a sound moral judgment and
 feel ownership to act to address a moral inci-
 dent but still remain inactive because of a lack
 of confidence, thus lowering moral conation. For
 example, an individual may feel that he or she
 should confront someone who has behaved un-
 ethically, but then not feel capable of doing so
 effectively. Moral efficacy has been recognized
 as an important factor in potentially addressing
 this gap in whether individuals will act ethi-
 cally (Hannah et al., 2005; May, Chan, Hodges, &
 Avolio, 2003). We define moral efficacy as an
 individual's belief in his or her capabilities to
 organize and mobilize the motivation , cognitive
 resources, means , and courses of action needed
 to attain moral performance , within a given
 moral domain , while persisting in the face of
 moral adversity. This definition draws on com-
 ponents of both means efficacy (Eden, 2001) and
 self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), which are both
 malleable and open to development.
 Bandura and Eden both argue that self- (Ban-
 dura) and means (Eden) efficacy are contextual-
 ized and, thus, domain specific, which is what
 distinguishes these constructs from the global
 and decontextualized construct of general effi-
 cacy (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). In this case a
 domain merely represents a defined area for
 which individuals may have greater or lesser
 levels of confidence, such as leader efficacy
 (Hannah, Avolio, Luthans, & Harms, 2008). Moral
 efficacy specifies the domain of moral action,
 which may be quite distinct from a person's ef-
 ficacy for other domains, such as leading others
 or public speaking.
 Metaanalytical research has demonstrated
 the influential role of self-efficacy in driving hu-
 man intentions and behaviors (see Stajkovic &
 Luthans, 1998). Applicable to one's capacity for
 moral conation, social and empathetic efficacy
 promote prosocial behavior, as evidenced by
 higher levels of helpfulness, cooperation, and
 sharing (Bandura, 1991). Further, based on find-
 ings that perceived behavioral control (a form of
 efficacy beliefs) helps to explain the intention-
 behavior linkage, we propose that moral effi-
 cacy will similarly create conation to act ethi-
 cally in line with intentions (Ajzen, 1991). This is
 consistent with Tre vino's (1986) suggestion that
 ego strength is a critical link between ethical
 judgments and action. While ego strength is a
 stable individual-difference construct relative to
 the more malleable construct of self-efficacy, it
 provides a similar self-regulatory function in
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 promoting conviction to one's actions (Rest,
 1986).
 Based on the work of Bandura (1997), we sug-
 gest that moral efficacy is composed of both
 magnitude (the level of difficulty one expects to
 successfully perform in a given moral situation)
 and strength (the extent of certainty one has in
 one's ability to perform to that level of difficulty).
 Further, we link moral efficacy to earlier discus-
 sions of self-complexity and the activation of a
 tailored moral working-self. This is because
 self-efficacy is not simply an assessment of
 one's skills but, rather, of what one can do with
 those skills in a given situation (Bandura, 1997),
 thereby influencing moral action in that and
 only that situation. This suggests individuals
 hold varying levels of moral efficacy across dif-
 ferent aspects of their self-identity (e.g., efficacy
 as a leader to discuss ethical issues with their
 group as opposed to a peer), creating some vari-
 ability in choices and behavior.
 Linking moral efficacy to self-concept unity,
 discussed earlier, we propose that through re-
 peated successful experiences regarding moral
 action, moral efficacy can be generalized across
 a broader set of moral contexts over time. Thus,
 we believe that moral efficacy, built through a
 wide span of rich personal mastery and model-
 ing/vicarious experiences, would continuously
 generalize across a widening expanse of moral
 tasks and contexts (Bandura, 1997).
 Eden made an important distinction between
 one's internal (self-efficacy) and external
 (means efficacy) sources of efficacy beliefs. Add-
 ing to our discussion above, means efficacy rep-
 resents individuals' beliefs in the quality and
 utility of the individuals, tools, methods, and
 procedures available for task performance in a
 given context. Research has shown that the ef-
 fects of means efficacy can be isolated from
 those of self-efficacy (Eden & Sulimani, 2002).
 These external resources can include imple-
 ments (e.g., equipment and computers), other
 persons (e.g., coworkers, followers, and supervi-
 sors), or bureaucratic means for accomplishing
 work (e.g., policies, procedures, and processes).
 We suggest that both sources of efficacy are
 necessary to fully explain moral conation. Spe-
 cifically, individuals must believe they not only
 have the personal capability to address a spe-
 cific moral issue (e.g., to disclose unethical ac-
 counting practices) but that supporting means
 are available to allow them to act successfully
 (e.g., peer/leader support or whistle-blower re-
 porting systems and protection). Because orga-
 nizations offer varying levels of promotion and
 support for ethical behavior (Victor & Cullen,
 1988), we propose that moral efficacy will be
 maximized when both self and means compo-
 nents are high. The effects of moral efficacy on
 moral conation lead to our next proposition.
 Proposition 7: Higher (lower) levels of
 moral efficacy will be associated with
 higher (lower) levels of (a) moral mo-
 tivation and (b) moral action.
 Moral Courage
 The final capacity underlying moral conation
 depicted in Figure 1 is moral courage. Hannah,
 Avolio, and Walumbwa define moral courage in
 the workplace as
 1) a malleable character strength, that 2) provides
 the requisite conation needed to commit to per-
 sonal moral principles, 3) under conditions where
 the actor is aware of the objective danger in-
 volved in supporting those principles, 4) that en-
 ables the willing endurance of that danger, 5) in
 order to act ethically or resist pressure to act
 unethically as required to maintain those princi-
 ples (2011: 560).
 Overcoming threat and perhaps fear for the
 sake of morals, virtue, or a higher purpose is
 inherent in definitions of courage (Gould, 2005;
 Kidder, 2003). Otherwise, action to overcome a
 perceived threat can be considered self-serving
 or foolhardy.
 Moral courage has been proposed as a critical
 factor in promoting ethical behavior in organi-
 zation members (Verschoor, 2003), and in an ini-
 tial field test Hannah et al. (2011) linked moral
 courage to externally rated ethical and proso-
 cial behaviors. Describing moral courage,
 Sekerka, Bagozzi, and Charnigo state that
 "strength of will is needed to face and resolve
 ethical challenges and to confront barriers that
 may inhibit the ability to proceed toward right
 action," and, therefore, moral courage is "a qual-
 ity or attribute necessary for ethical behavior in
 organizational settings" (2009: 566). Research
 has differentiated moral courage from other
 forms of courage, such as physical or social
 courage (Rate, Clarke, Lindsay, & Sternberg,
 2007; Woodard & Pury, 2007). Yet, as noted by
 Hannah and Avolio (2010), empirical work on
 moral courage is nascent and has not been ad-
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 equately integrated with other aspects of moral
 psychology, such as we have proposed in Fig-
 ure 1, nor integrated with the processes in Rest
 et al.'s four-component model.
 Providing this integration is important, since
 we propose that the three components of moral
 conation are mutually supporting. Individuals
 may feel responsibility to act (i.e., have moral
 ownership) and believe that they have the ca-
 pacity to do so (i.e., have moral efficacy), yet still
 have insufficient courage to overcome the threat
 they face and to act. Moral ownership, efficacy,
 and courage, thus, are each necessary yet not
 sufficient. Supporting this position, Osswald et
 al. (2009) have noted that feelings of responsibil-
 ity and competence are required to support
 moral courage. Similarly, in their model of gen-
 eral courage (not necessarily moral courage),
 Hannah, Sweeney, and Lester (2010) propose
 that both self- and means efficacy are required
 to reinforce one to act with courage. This is in
 part because courage is often relative to expe-
 rienced fear, and negative emotions such as fear
 occur when individuals assess that a given
 threat exceeds their perceived ability to face
 that threat (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985).
 Moral efficacy would thus bolster perceived ca-
 pability, and hence moral courage, all working
 together to produce higher levels of moral
 conation.
 Finally, consistent with the concept of differ-
 entiation and integration/unity presented ear-
 lier, individuals will possess greater or lesser
 amounts of courage across identity subdimen-
 sions. For example, a person may have more
 moral courage in his or her role as a leader than
 as a follower. He or she will then demonstrate
 greater moral courage when the leader role is
 active (e.g., confronting a follower) than when
 the follower role is active (e.g., confronting his or
 her own senior leader). Thus, moral courage,
 like moral efficacy, is contextualized and do-
 main specific. Yet Shepela et al. (1999) have sug-
 gested that moral courage related to certain val-
 ues can be core to a person (what we have
 defined as high unity) and therefore especially
 powerful in prompting moral courage across a
 broader set of domains. This leads to our final
 proposition.
 Proposition 8: Higher (lower) levels of
 moral courage will be associated with
 higher (lo er) (a) moral mo ivation
 and (b) moral action .
 DISCUSSION
 The comprehensive framework shown in Fig-
 re 1 has implications for theory, methods, and
 practice. The model offers new approaches for
 defining and measuring moral capacities and
 can generate new lines of research to predict
 ethical thoughts and behaviors in organizations.
 Implications for Theory
 As stated earlier, Rest et al. (1999) reported
 that moral judgment as measured by the DIT
 typically only explains about 20 percent of the
 variance in actual ethical behavior. These au-
 thors note the need to develop models that bet-
 ter explain the entire ethical process and that
 although "there is much diversity of constructs,
 processes, phenomena, and starting points for
 the psychology of morality, the greater chal-
 lenge is to formulate how all these different
 parts fit together" (1999: 6). We have made one
 attempt to circumscribe such an integrated
 framework, identifying developed capacities re-
 lated to each of Rest's (1986) four stages. Impor-
 tant to promoting future research, we demon-
 strate how each component in our model can be
 operationalized and measured.
 Benefits of a complexity approach. A primary
 contribution of our model is the incorporation of
 theories of cognitive complexity and self-
 complexity throughout the model. While Kohl-
 berg's interview process and Rest's ethical di-
 lemma exercises are meant to denote general
 levels of development in logic or moral sche-
 ma , these techniques are abstract, focus only
 on moral judgment, and do not recognize the
 imp tant role of identity and accompanying
 self-regulatory functions in explaining an indi-
 vidual's moral capacity to take action.
 Below we show how complexity can be mea-
 sured more directly than by Kohlberg's or Rest's
 techniques through schema mapping, Q-sort
 tasks, self-complexity matrices, and other tech-
 niques. Employing such techniques will refine
 our measurements and understanding of what
 constitutes moral complexity. Further, a self-
 complexity approach will allow researchers to
 extend beyond current "global" measures of
 moral identity, moral efficacy, and moral cour-
 678 Academy of Management Review October
 age and, instead, to compartmentalize mea-
 sures to explore how higher or lower levels of
 these constructs are represented across differ-
 ent aspects of self-identity. Such an approach
 should increase the predictive validity of mea-
 sures, as well as explore within-person variance
 across situations as individuals' working selves
 are activated or suppressed (Markus & Wurf,
 1987). Further, these techniques will allow re-
 searchers to mathematically express the level of
 inclusion of various moral attributes across self-
 identities and, therefore, the level of unity each
 participant has related to attributes of interest
 to researchers (e.g., a certain set of moral val-
 ues). These measures of unity can thus be used
 to predict self-concordant ethical behaviors.
 Contribution of moral conation. We believe
 our framing of the moral conation constructs offers
 new insights into the transference of moral judg-
 ments, through intentions, into action. Discus-
 sions of moral courage date to antiquity, and it
 is the most theoretically developed of the three
 moral conation capacities. Yet the study of
 moral courage in organizational contexts has
 been limited (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Sekerka et
 al., 2009). Further, we are not aware of any prior
 work on the construct of moral ownership in the
 literature and have noted only limited theoreti-
 cal development regarding moral efficacy (e.g.,
 Hannah et al., 2005; May et al., 2003).
 Prior theorizing of moral efficacy has also failed
 to incorporate how contextual factors influence
 an individual's level of moral efficacy to act. To
 address this gap, we have included means effi-
 cacy in our construct definition. Finally, we have
 integrated the moral conation constructs and
 argued that moral ownership, efficacy, and
 courage each provide necessary yet not suffi-
 cient contributions to moral conation and, thus,
 should be studied and developed together.
 Operationalizing Moral Maturation
 One criticism of Kohlberg's stages of devel-
 opment has been the requirement for inter-
 views and the subjectivity associated with in-
 terpretations and coding of participant
 responses. Furthermore, both Kohlberg's inter-
 view and Rest et al.'s (1999) written scenario
 response technique in the DIT utilize stan-
 dardized ethical dilemmas that neglect the
 contextualized nature of moral knowledge we
 presented earlier. If we are to develop a
 deeper understanding of individuals' moral
 maturation, we must measure moral identity
 and complexity along with associated meta-
 cognitive abilities whenever possible within
 domains, and then test their effects when in-
 dividuals are confronted with moral dilemmas
 within and between those domains. Rest et
 al.'s scenarios, such as the "Heinz" dilemma
 (regarding whether the target individual
 should steal a drug his wife needs from a
 pharmacist), address the broad, abstract rea-
 soning of cases most would never face, versus
 the more common concrete and complex situ-
 tions individuals face in organizational life.
 Further, the DIT purports to measure cognitive
 moral development (CMD) levels by having par-
 ticipants read scenarios and then rate and rank
 various standardized decision criteria based on
 the importance of those criteria in making a
 deci ion. Each of those criteria is designated as
personal interest, maintaining order, or postcon-
 ventional reasoning levels. Thus, the more im-
 portance an individual ascribes to items associ-
 ated with postconventional reasoning, the
 higher that individual will score on postconven-
 tional CMD. One weakness of this system is that
 the DIT ostensibly is a recognition task, where
 participants can read and select items represent-
 ing decision criteria that they may never have
 even thought of on their own if not prompted by
 the responses given in the measure.
 We believe levels of moral cognitive complex-
 ity can be determined through more direct meth-
 ods by using schema mapping (also known as
 cognitive or causal mapping) techniques to as-
 sess individuals' concepts of morality (i.e.,
 knowledge content), as well as the structure
 with which they store that content. Schema map-
 ping has been used successfully to assess other
 areas of individuals' knowledge structures in
 organizational research (e.g., Eden, Ackermann,
 & Cropper, 1992; Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995).
 This technique has also been used to map ethical
 schemas of journalists (Lind, Rarick, & Swenson-
 Lepper, 1997).
 Based on the work of Schroder et al. (1967),
 complexity integration and differentiation can
 also be measured using thematic apperception
 tests, such as picture story exercises (Baker-
 Brown et al., 1992; Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry,
 1993), where open-ended responses are exter-
 nally rated for levels of complexity by trained
 coders. These techniques, however, would need
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 to be modified to focus on moral content. Fur-
 ther, there are recent advances in neuroscience
 that may enable researchers to assess complex-
 ity through brain mapping techniques. For ex-
 ample, a measure called "coherence" deter-
 mines how differentiated the human brain is
 either at rest or while processing tasks and may
 be one metric that can be used to assess how
 individuals process moral tasks (see Thatcher,
 North, & Biver, 2008).
 Adopting a self-complexity approach to exam-
 ining moral identity will also require a funda-
 mentally different approach to measurement
 than the current single-survey techniques com-
 monly used. Moral self-complexity can be as-
 sessed by having participants produce the var-
 ious key roles of their identity (e.g., "self as team
 leader" or "self as coworker") in free-response
 formats, or by using roles as designated by the
 researcher, and then by sorting ethical attri-
 butes of interest to the researcher (e.g., values or
 traits) as to whether, and the extent to which,
 each attribute applies to each role using the
 Q-sort technique of Linville (1987) or the survey
 format used by Woolfolk et al. (2004). Regardless
 of the technique used, data can then be format-
 ted into a matrix (self-aspects or roles X attri-
 butes). Once compiled, the h-statistic (Scott,
 1969) can then be used to analyze the complexity
 of the matrix.
 The h-statistic represents an index of the num-
 ber of independent dimensions underlying any
 set of attribute ratings. Such matrices can also
 illuminate what moral attributes are repre-
 sented across a breadth of social roles, denoting
 what we discussed above as constituting self-
 concept unity. Finally, measurement methods
 for metacognitive ability also exist in the edu-
 cation literature that could be modified to as-
 sess participants' knowledge and regulation of
 moral cognition (Baker & Cerro, 2000; Dunlosky
 & Metcalfe, 2009).
 In sum, having the ability to measure these
 components allows researchers not only to test
 our proposed theory but also to measure moral
 maturation over time. In combination, we hope
 to advance both the science and practice asso-
 ciated with moral capacity development.
 Operationalizing Moral Conation
 Unlike the more complicated constructs of
 moral maturation, the constructs of moral
 conation lend themselves more readily to survey
 methodology and self- and other reports. Han-
 nah and Avolio (2010) recently developed a new
 multidimensional measure representing the
 three components of moral conation, based on
 prior work on psychological ownership (Van
 Dyne & Pierce, 2004), self-efficacy (Bandura,
 1997), and moral courage (Gould, 2005; Kidder,
 2003). They tested this three-factor measure and
 found across two studies that moral ownership,
 moral efficacy, and moral courage are discrim-
 inant constructs yet share variance in that they
 for  a higher-order construct. Their initial
 model testing supports our theorizing that the
 components of moral conation are each neces-
 sary yet not sufficient. Sekerka et al. (2009) also
 has conducted an initial validation of an orga-
 nizati al moral courage measure.
 Based on the tenets of self-complexity theory
 presented earlier, moral ownership, courage,
 and fficacy will be represented in varied forms
 and levels across one's self-identity. Therefore,
 we suggest that researchers assess these con-
 structs of moral conation across different as-
 pects of participants' self-identity. This can be
 done by presenting respondents with separate
 scales (e.g., moral courage) for each of their var-
 ious relevant social roles, preferably separating
 each survey administration across time to re-
 duce carryover effects. For example, survey item
 stems for a moral efficacy measure might ask,
 "When leading my top management team I
 can. . . " and, on a second version, "When work-
 ing with my peers I can
 various roles can then be collapsed into a ma-
 trix to assess dispersion of moral efficacy across
 roles, allowing researchers to investigate the
 effects of moral efficacy across contexts based
 on individuals' efficacy magnitude and strength
 associated with each context. The differentia-
 tion of moral efficacy across the self-identity can
 also be assessed using the h-statistic based on
is matrix, as described previously. Similar
methods can be used for assessing each moral
 conation construct.
 Implications for Practice
 We believe that we have offered a set of con-
 structs associated with moral maturation and
 moral conation that addresses the capacities
 needed across all stages of ethical processing,
 from the stage of sensitivity through to action.
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 These capacities are both malleable and mea-
 surable and can thus be used for selection pur-
 poses and to implement and assess moral de-
 velopment interventions over time in those
 organizations seeking to enhance the moral ca-
 pacity of their members.4 We briefly introduce
 some methods for developing each capacity in
 Figure 1 simply to highlight the model's utility
 and to encourage future research on moral ca-
 pacity development.
 Developing moral maturation capacity. Moral
 complexity can foremost be developed through
 social learning, including rich personal mastery
 or vicarious experiences in specific domains.
 Other authors have similarly noted the power of
 social learning in ethical decision making based
 on moral approbation, where individuals learn
 the response consequences of ethical actions
 Qones & Ryan, 1998). The development of moral
 maturation occurs as exposure to moral experi-
 ences and conflicts triggers the development of
 new associations between concepts held in an
 individual's mental representations, thereby en-
 hancing the individual's level of complexity
 (Street et al., 2001; Walker, 1983; Young & Wasser-
 man, 2005). In a training setting moral complexity
 can be developed through moral discourse, in-
 cluding (1) teaching cognitive moral reasoning
 skills (e.g., logic, role-taking, or justice concepts),
 (2) instructing and facilitating group reasoning
 through exercises and case analysis, and (3) dis-
 cussing ethics in practical applied areas an indi-
 vidual may face (e.g., dentistry, journalism, medi-
 cine; Bebeau, 2002; Hartwell, 1995). For example, a
 review of twenty-three ethics programs reported
 by Rest and Thoma (1986) showed that those using
 group moral dilemma discussions had an average
 .41 effect size in raising levels of cognitive moral
 development versus .09 for those without moral
 discussion.
 We believe that moral metacognitive ability
 can be developed through teaching techniques
 to process moral dilemmas through deeper self-
 reflection (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Setterlund &
 Niedenthal, 1993) and practicing executive con-
 trol over moral processing (Metcalfe & Shima-
 mura, 1994). Example executive control "drills"
 could include guiding questions, such as
 4 We recognize that some organizations may be ambiva-
 lent about or even condone their members' unethical acts or
 that they do not otherwise want to invest the time and
 resources in developing members' moral capacity.
 "Which of your core beliefs are at stake?" "How
 central are those values to you?" and/or "How
 are your emotions influencing your thoughts
 and behaviors right now?" Further, teaching
 skills to methodically review moral issues
 through multiple perspectives - for example, de-
 ontological (rules, duties, or norms), teleological
 (utilitarian, consequence, or goal-based), or val-
 ues-based reasoning - would force individuals
 to access and "exercise" various moral sche-
 mata, enhancing their level of moral complexity
 and metacognitive moral processing ability.
 Finally, moral identity can be particularly de-
 veloped through exposure to moral role models
 that provide an ideal to strive for, and it serves
 to motivate and guide others' development (Lord
 & Brown, 2004; Mayer et al., 2009). Research has
 also shown that dialogue with others at higher
 levels of CMD promotes moral development by
 offering the individual new perspectives with
 which to think about ethical issues (Dukerich,
 Nichols, Elm, & Volrath, 1990).
 Developing moral conation capacity. Based on
 the work of Bandura (1991, 1999), we believe that
 organizations can heighten moral ownership by
 (1) placing issues in humanistic terms, (2) dis-
 couraging euphemisms and sanitizing lan-
 guage (e.g., "collateral damage"), (3) encourag-
 ing responsibility, (4) making salient the
 injurious effects of potential actions, and (5) lim-
 iting attribution of blame to or dehumanization
 of victims. This is consistent with previous eth-
 ics research specifying the important role of
 highlighting the consequences of one's behav-
 iors to increase moral engagement (e.g., Ferrell
 & Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). This is
 also consistent with Jones's (1991) theory of
 moral intensity, which has shown that people
 become more morally engaged by raising the
 perceived "intensity" associated with an ethical
 dilemma (cf. Butterfield, Trevino, & Weaver,
 2000; Watley & May, 2004). Similarly, Jones and
Ryan (1998) have proposed that organizations
 can reinforce ethical behavior by raising the
perceived severity of consequences, moral cer-
 t inty, degree of complicity, and pressure to
 comply.
 Organizational reward and control systems
 may also enhance moral ownership (Trevino,
 Brown, & Pincus-Hartman, 2003). These systems
 can signal what is valued in organizations, and
 research has shown that although individuals
 may initially comply with norms for strategic
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 self-presentation, over time# such norms can
 cause identity changes that can impact the in-
 dividual's sense of responsibility to take moral
 action (e.g., Tice, 1992). If not properly aligned
 with moral action, however, such reward sys-
 tems may create a negative pressure to comply
 with unethical actions (Jones & Ryan, 1998).
 Through social learning where successful
 moral performance is achieved, individuals
 will not only build greater moral complexity but
 also the confidence to enact similar approaches
 to address future ethical challenges (Bandura,
 1997). Ethical role models can also reinforce ob-
 servers' efficacy, as well as the collective effi-
 cacy of the group, to act morally over time (Ban-
 dura, 2002). This may be one mechanism
 explaining how ethical leadership can diffuse to
 others throughout an organization (Mayer et al.,
 2009). Hannah et al. (201 1) demonstrate that lead-
 ers who are seen as being authentic can bolster
 followers' moral courage and subsequent ethi-
 cal and prosocial behaviors. They theorize that
 authentic leaders serve as moral exemplars and
 also establish transparent climates that encour-
 age followers to openly espouse their values
 and to act in line with those values coura-
 geously. Further, training programs have re-
 cently shown some success in developing moral
 courage through teaching behavior routines
 (i.e., scripts) individuals can use when facing
 threats (e.g., Jonas, Boos, & Brandstatter, 2007;
 Osswald et al., 2009). Finally, Walker and Hen-
 ning (2004) suggest that moral exemplars can
 have a contagion effect on others such that ob-
 servers come to believe they, too, have the cour-
 age to successfully meet similar threats.
 Boundaries and Future Research
 For the sake of parsimony, we have focused on
 the individual level in developing our model in
 order to detail the component processes that
 underlie individual moral maturation and moral
 conation. We suggest, however, that the model
 may be applied as a multilevel framework to
 explain how groups and organizations develop
 a higher "moral perspective." For example, self-
 efficacy and collective efficacy are reciprocal
 and entrained (Bandura, 1997). The constructs
 associated with this model lend themselves to
 investigation of how individual development
 can extend to collective development through
 social learning and influence processes, similar
 to the effects of a leader's efficacy in bolstering
 the collective leadership efficacy of his or her
 group (Hannah et al., 2008). Since knowledge can
 be distributed across members o  a group and
 combined through social interaction as needed
 o enhance group processing (Kozlowski & Ilgen,
 2006), even moral complexity might be concep-
 tualized and measured as a multilevel con-
 struct.
 Repeatedly throughout this article we have
 noted that aspects of moral maturation and
 moral conation should be tailored to specific
 contexts. This is because different contexts,
 such as national or organizational cultures,
 have different social mores (Margolis & Phillips,
 1999; Shweder, 1991), and culture influences eth-
 ical processing (see Kish-Gephart, Harrison, &
 Trevino, 2010; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
 We believe our model can be tailored to specific
 cultures (e.g., by measuring complexity based
 on particular cultural mores). Yet our proposed
 model is not context neutral. Researchers should
 assess how cultural contingencies and con-
 straints influence the predictions associated
 with our model (see Trevino et al., 2006).
 CONCLUSION
 We propose that rates of unethical behavior
 can be decreased and virtuous behavior in or-
 ganizations increased through the development
 of moral capacity - what we have conceptual-
 ized as moral maturation and moral conation. In
 proposing the current model, we hope we have
 provided a clearer line of sight to the capacities
 underlying moral development and have pro-
 vided propositions and measurement ap-
 proaches to promote future research.
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